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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EARL A. JOHNSON, dba Albeth Com-
pany, and BETH JOHNSON, his 
wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ROCKING V HORSE TRAILERS, 
INC., and ANN F. OLSEN, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
13509 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiffs to quiet title to 
certain real property located in Utah County, State of 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On the 16th day of October, 1973, the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District, the Honorable George 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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E. Ballif, District Judge, granted plaintiffs' motion for 
Summary Judgment, quieting title to the subject real 
estate to the plaintiffs, and denying the defendants' and 
appellants' motion for Summary Judgment. Said decision 
being made on the basis that the defendant, Ann F. 
Olsen, had no interest in the subject real property, and 
that tender of payment under a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was insufficient as a matter of law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek reversal of the trial court's ruling 
on the plaintiffs' motion for Summary Judgment; and 
seeks a remand of the matter to the District Court for 
enforcement of a Uniform Real Estate Contract and de-
termination of the amounts due and owing to complete 
payment of said contract in full. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The subject action is concerned with the equitable 
and record ownership and chain of title to real property 
located in Utah County, State of Utah, which are as fol-
lows: 
On November 10,1966, Lamar C. Clark and Georgina 
Clark, his wife, were record owners on the subject real 
estate. On said date they entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, wherein it was proposed that upon pay-
ment in full by the Buyers, that the Clarks would transfer 
their interest in subject property to the named buyer, 
who was Rocking '0 ' Horse Trailers, Incorporated; said 
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3 
corporation being a defendant in the instant action (R. 
64, 65,108). The corporation made the monthly payments 
required by the contract, through and including Septem-
ber 1, 1968 (R. 108). On January 30, 1967, Rocking ' 0 ' 
Horse Trailers filed a petition in bankruptcy, which peti-
tion set forth as an asset of the bankrupt the equitable 
interest in the subject real property as provided by the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. On the 3rd day of June, 
1968, the bankruptcy court entered an Order of Dis-
claimer regarding the subject premises, and the trustee 
in bankruptcy was relieved from any further responsibili-
ties pertaining to the subject property (R. 80, 109). On 
the 12th of November, 1968, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, a lien creditor of Rocking *0' Horse Trailers, In-
corporated, offered the subject property for sale by sealed 
bid (R. 66, 109). Plaintiffs tendered a bid to the Internal 
Revenue Service pursuant to such offering in the sum of 
$8,009.00, which was the high bid and which was accepted 
by the Internal Revenue Service (R. 109). Following the 
acceptance of said bid the Internal Revenue Service ob-
tained an Order of Eviction, and caused the United States 
Marshall to forcibly evict Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers 
from occupancy of the premises (R. 59, 1,10). Following 
the eviction, the plaintiffs then went into occupancy of 
the premises. However, shortly thereafter the Internal 
Revenue Service determined to cancel the sale of the sub-
ject premises to the plaintiffs herein, and the bid of the 
plaintiffs was cancelled and their payment refunded (R. 
66 (Exhibit "E"), 110). This was done without notice 
to Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers, Incorporated. Thereafter 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the plaintiffs purchased from the record owners, the 
Clarks, their interest in the property; this purchase was 
by way of Quitclaim Deed and an Assignment on the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract between the Clarks and 
Rocking '0 ' Horse Trailers, and was for the sum of 
$1,500.00 (R. 107). On December 17, 1969 the corpora-
tion discovered that the Internal Revenue Service had 
not completed the sale of the property to the plaintiffs. 
The Internal Revenue Service then released its lien in the 
property and the corporation, for valuable consideration, 
assigned all of its right, title and interest in and to the 
subject premises by reason of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract to Ann F. Olsen (R. 67, 69, 108). Thereafter, 
Ann F. Olsen, through her attorney and representatives, 
had contact with the plaintiffs and their attorney for 
the purpose of resolving the ownership of the property 
and the resolution of the equitable interest of the parties 
therein (R. 110). On January 22, 1973 the plaintiffs 
without prior notice of termination of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract (R. 109) filed a complaint to quiet title 
in the matter. Following the filing of the legal action, 
defendant, Ann F. Olsen, as assignee of Rocking 'O' Horse 
Trailers, tendered to the plaintiffs by personal check, the 
entire balance due and owing according to her calcula-
tions, as shown upon the face of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (R. 109). The check was tendered upon the 
condition that it would be presented to First Security 
Bank of Utah, Nephi Office, for payment and that said 
bank would pay said check upon presentation of the 
check, accompanied by the Warranty Deed and the Title 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Insurance specified in the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
This check has never been returned, but has not been 
negotiated (R. 109). Some pertinent facts regarding 
the legal proceedings are as follows: 
Ann F. Olsen filed an answer in behalf of herself and 
as assignee of Rocking '0 ' Horse Trailers, Incorporated. 
After the filing of such answer, plaintiffs moved ex-party 
and without notice to counsel of Ann F. Olsen, for the 
default judgment against Rocking *0' Horse Trailers, In-
corporated; that default judgment was granted. There-
after, while said default judgment was in effect, hearing 
upon the motions for Summary Judgment was had, and 
as a result of those hearings the Court entered the judg-
ment which is appealed from. Following the entry of 
that judgment, Ann F. Olsen filed her motion to vacate 
the default judgment against the corporation. That mo-
tion was granted (R. 105). In addition the plaintiffs filed 
a motion to amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. That Motion was granted, and Amended Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared and 
are filed herein (R. 106). The Court granted the plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment upon the basis that 
the corporation had no right, title or interest in the sub-
ject property on the date of assignment to Ann F. Olsen 
for the reason that the interest of the corporation in the 
subject premises had been vested in the bankruptcy trus-
tee on the filing of the corporation's petition in bank-
ruptcy. The Court further found that the payment ten-
dered by Ann F. Olsen to the plaintiffs herein, by way 
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of her personal check was insufficient in law, however 
no determination of the amount due under the contract 
was made; and the appellants stood before the court pre-
pared to pay such amount as was determined by the 
court (R. 115-116). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANT-
ING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE 
PLAINTIFFS HEREIN AND HOLDING 
THAT THE ASSIGNMENT FROM ROCK-
ING '0' HORSE TRAILERS, INCORPOR-
ATED TO ANN F. OLSEN WAS WITHOUT 
EFFECT BY REASON OF THE VESTING 
THE TITLE OF THE EQUITABLE INTER-
EST OF ROCKING 'O' HORSE TRAILERS, 
IN THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY. 
The appellants premise this argument upon the bank-
ruptcy law and upon the real property law of the state 
of Utah. 
As to the bankruptcy procedure, when Rocking '0 ' 
Horse Trailers filed its petition for bankruptcy, title to 
the subject property vested in the trustee in bankruptcy. 
11 U. S. C. A. Section 110. Because the property was en-
cumbered with a federal tax lien, the trustee was unable 
to sell or manage the property for the benefit of the credi-
tors. The trustee therefore petititoned the bankruptcy 
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court for an Order of Abandonment (R. 80), which peti-
tion was granted (R. 83). The effect of an Order of 
Abandonment or disclaimer, is to relieve the trustee from 
further duties as to such property, and to re-vest title 
to the subject property in the bankrupt. Brookhaven 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Gwin, 253 F. 2d 17 (5th Cir. 1958) ; 
In Re AldricKs Estate, 215 P. 2d 724, 35 C. 2d 20 (1950); 
9 Am. Jur. 2d 706, Bankruptcy Section 943. The vesting 
of title by reason of bankruptcy proceedings is a matter 
of the bankruptcy law, and does not occur by document 
entered in the County records where the chain of title is 
recorded. Re-vesting upon an abandonment or disclaimer, 
re-vests the title and relates back to the date of the filing 
of the petition of bankruptcy. And the title of the bank-
rupt continues as if the bankruptcy petition had not 
been filed or had not occurred. Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 
U. S. 598, 57 S. Ct. 924 (1937); Helvey v. U. S. Building 
& Loan Ass'n of Los Angeles, 184 P. 2d 919, 81 C. A. 2d 
647 (1947). Therefore in the instant matter, on the date 
Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers filed its petition in bank-
ruptcy, its equitable interest in the real property vested 
in its trustee in bankruptcy. The equitable interest in 
real property arises from the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract, with the record owner retaining bare legal title as 
a security interest in the property, subject to payment 
in full by the purchasers. In Re Estate of Willson, 28 U. 
2d 197, 499 P. 2d 1298 (1972). Therefore, the equitable 
interest held by Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers, under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, did upon the filing of the 
petition of bankruptcy vest in the trustee in the bank-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ruptcy. However, when the trustee in bankruptcy se-
cured the Order of Abandonment from the bankruptcy 
judge, title re-vested the equitable interest of Rocking 
'0 ' Horse Trailers in that corporation, subject to the 
record lien encumbrances; especially the lien of the In-
ternal Revenue Service. The Internal Revenue Service 
then proceeded to execute upon their lien. The Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue acts pursuant to the collec-
tion process in the capacity of a lienor, as distinguished 
from the owner, and legal and equitable title never did 
vest in the Internal Revenue Service, U. S. v. Sulliven, 
333 F. 2d 100 (3d Cir. 1964), but merely passed from the 
corporation to the trustee in bankruptcy, and back to the 
corporation. Although, the Internal Revenue Service 
proceeded with a duly authorized sale of the property, 
at the normal conclusion of which the title would by rea-
son of legal document and law, be vested in the purchaser 
of such sale; in this matter such title transfer and vesting 
never did occur by reason of the Internal Revenue Service 
abandoning their sale procedure, and no claim is made 
by reason of the Internal Revenue Service sale. The 
plaintiffs herein claim right to the subject property by 
virtue of possession, quitclaim deed, and an assignment 
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. Possession was 
acquired through the Internal Revenue Service's use of 
forcible eviction of the Rocking '0 ' Horse Trailer cor-
poration. There was no abandonment of the premises by 
the corporation. Plaintiffs herein had knowledge and no-
tice of the existence of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
by reason of their assignment of the same. Knowledge 
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of these facts is also readily evident by reason of the 
great disparity in the purchase price considered by the 
plaintiffs; $8,000.00 bid to the Internal Revenue Service, 
$1,500.00 paid for the assignment of Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, and the Quitclaim Deed. Assignment under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract placed the plaintiffs 
in the exact same position as the Clarks under the Uni-
form Real Estate Contract; that is, as holding bare legal 
title as a security interest subject to the payment in full 
by the corporation, or in this case, by the lawful assignee 
of the corporation, Ann F. Olsen. Therefore, we find the 
equitable chain of title going from Lamar C. and Georgina 
Clark, by reason of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, to 
Rocking '0 ' Horse Trailers, Incorporated, then passing 
from Rocking '0 ' Horse Trailers, Incorporated, to the 
trustee in bankruptcy by reason of the bankruptcy peti-
tion; thereafter title passed from the trustee in bank-
ruptcy back to the Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers, Incorpor-
ated by reason of the Order of Abandonment. Thereafter, 
the equitable title passed from Rocking 'O' Horse Trail-
ers, Incorporated to Ann F. Olsen by reason of the assign-
ment. Therefore, as the parties appeared before the trial 
court, for hearing upon the motion for summary judg-
ment, Ann F. Olsen had the equitable interest in the sub-
ject property, by reason of the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract, and the plaintiffs had record ownership by reason 
of the Quitclaim Deed and Assignment of Contract. 
Prior to the hearing upon the Motion of Summary 
Judgment, Ann F. Olsen had tendered to the plaintiffs, 
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her check drawn on First Security Bank of Utah, Nephi 
Office, in a sum representing the full balance owing under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract. Ann F. Olsen in-
structed the plaintiffs that said check was to be presented 
to First Security Bank of Utah, Nephi Office, and at 
the time of presentation for payment, the plaintiffs were 
to deliver the Warranty Deed and Title Insurance called 
for in the Uniform Real Estate Contract; the bank would 
upon such presentation, pay the check in full. The Uni-
form Real Estate Contract provided that upon payment 
in full, the Warranty Deed, together with the title in-
surance would be delivered to the purchasers. The pur-
chasers, evidencing their willingness to pay simultaneous 
with such delivery, or within minutes before such delivery, 
and requiring that the Seller be prepared to deliver the 
Warranty Deed and the Title Insurance at the time of 
payment in full. Requesting the Seller to deliver the deed 
and title insurance is not an unreasonable requirement 
and does not vitiate the tender of payment. These are 
not conditions, such as would make the tender of pay-
ment a conditional tender outside the scope of the con-
tract between the parties and insufficient in law. 55 
Am. Jur. 770, Vendor Purchaser Section 342; 52 Am. Jur. 
231, Tender Section 24. Furthermore, as Ann F. Olsen 
appeared before the Court with her legal counsel, the 
question of the amount owed under the contract was sub-
mitted for the Court's determination, together with a 
commitment to pay such amount. It was therefore a 
manifest abuse of justice for the Court to terminate the 
rights of Ann F. Olsen to pay the full amount due and 
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owing under the contract; and receive and return a deed 
to the property, plus the title insurance provided by the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract; and it was a manifest 
error of the Court to rule as a matter of law, that the title 
to the subject property remained in the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. 
Following the logical line of the Court's decision, it 
would indicate that title to the subject real estate would 
still be vested subject to the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract, in the trustee in bankruptcy of Rocking '0 ' Horse 
Trailers, Incorporated. Furthermore, if title to the real 
property is vested in that trustee, it would appear unwise 
for the Court to enter an Order Quieting Title to the 
property in the plaintiffs herein. However, this is not 
the case, the Court was in error in its determination, for 
equitable title had revested in the corporation upon the 
date of the disclaimer, and if not then, on the date of the 
discharge of the bankrupt, 8 B. C. J. S. 166, Bankruptcy 
Section 591; Stipe v. Jefferson, 257 N. W. 99, (Minn. 
1934), which occurred on the 23rd day of October, 1969, 
approximately 2 months prior to the transfer to Ann F. 
F. Olsen. Therefore, based upon the record chain of title, 
the existing valid contracts between the parties, and the 
events that had transpired, including the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, and the Internal Revenue Service eviction and 
abortive sale, when the plaintiff and Ann F. Olsen ap-
peared before the District Court on the 21st day of Sep-
tember, 1973, record title to the subject property was 
vested in the plaintiffs, subject to the rights of Ann F. 
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Olsen, which rights were defined by the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. Since Ann F. Olsen was then willing to 
pay the balance due under that contract and had previ-
ously tendered full payment on the contract, it was then 
encumbent upon the District Judge to determine that 
amount, and order the plaintiffs to deliver a warranty 
deed and title insurance immediately following the re-
ceipt of such amount due. The Court's failure to enter 
such an Order was a mistake in law, and must be cor-
rected upon this appeal by reversing the judgment of the 
trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
In the conclusion, the appellants request the Court 
to reverse the decision of the trial court, and to remand 
the matter with instructions that the defendant, Ann. F. 
Olsen, is entitled to judgment of the trial court, ruling 
that the Uniform Real Estate Contract of which she is an 
assignee, is a valid and enforceable document; that the 
trial court should receive evidence to determine the 
amount which is due and owing under said Unifomi Real 
Estate Contract, and then enter its Order requiring the 
plaintiffs to deliver its Warranty Deed and Title Insur-
ance to Ann F. Olsen, upon her prior payment in full of 
the sum owing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MILTON T. HARMON 
53 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Attorney for Appellants 
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